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1  Introduction
Mass poverty in South Africa continues to present a considerable challenge 
in various forms. Notwithstanding ongoing debates about how best to describe 
and measure poverty, while poverty remains very widespread, the available 
data point to a reduction in extreme destitution in recent years. This is to a large 
extent due to the redistributive targeting and successful impact of a number 
of laws, policies and programmes aimed at addressing poverty and inequality 
implemented in the country since the demise of apartheid. The transformation 
from a racially-based, resource-biased society to an egalitarian one where all 
enjoy the aims, values and rights upheld in the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution” or “the South African Constitution”), 
requires a concerted effort by all institutional players to redress the material 
as well as the psycho-socio-political deficiencies that continue to inhibit the 
full enjoyment of our new democracy for approximately half the population.
This article commences with a discussion of the origin and evolution of 
the concept of transformative constitutionalism in South Africa and what 
it means for addressing poverty and inequality. The Constitution, and in 
particular the Bill of Rights, has a critical role to play in advancing poverty 
reduction through the courts, the legislature and the executive. The rights to 
life, equality, dignity, administrative justice and socio-economic rights are all 
instruments that can be sharpened further to tackle poverty and inequality 
and thereby transform our society.
The next part will discuss Amartya Sen’s analysis of the links between 
public reasoning, democracy and justice. Sen argues that the attainment of 
social justice, without public reasoning based on participatory and deliberative 
democratic models, is not possible. It will then examine the participatory and 
deliberative dimensions of democracy in the South African Constitution that 
support the transformation project.
In the final part I outline the political-economy underpinnings of the South 
African government’s historical and current policy responses to poverty 
reduction and inequality. The South African government’s discourse has
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shifted in the last five years from a welfare state approach to a democratic 
developmental state approach. Both welfare and developmental states aim 
at a more equitable redistribution of resources in society, but developmental 
states differ from welfare states mostly in the free market alliances between 
government and business, soft authoritarianism and a strong public sector 
bureaucracy. I argue that a shift to a democratic developmental state – as a 
transitional state – is necessary in order to achieve equitable socio-economic 
transformation in South Africa. The democratic developmental state emphasises 
the collaborative role of all players in society and the empowerment of the 
poor in the development project. Participation and empowerment are central 
means and ends in our transformative Constitution. There is a limit to what 
lawyers can say about models of the developmental state; however, lawyers 
can contribute to an understanding of the type of state that we need in order 
to realise the rights in the Constitution. Participatory democracy is the most 
powerful guarantee for the poor that their interests will not be disregarded.
2  Transformative constitutionalism and poverty
It is widely acknowledged that the South African Constitution is a 
progressive and transformative legal instrument.1 As the supreme law, its 
purpose is to regulate public power and to frame “an objective, normative 
value system”2 in a post-apartheid society. All law and conduct must conform 
to its provisions, failing which it is invalid.3 This system of normative values 
seeks to fulfil a constitutional imperative to remedy South Africa’s past 
and “transform our society into one in which there will be human dignity, 
freedom and equality”.4 This is vividly expressed in the Preamble to the 
Constitution, and then in section 7(1),5 in the Bill of Rights (Chapter 2), 
and throughout the Constitution. The Bill of Rights binds the legislature, the 
executive, the judiciary, all organs of state, and, where applicable, a natural 
or juristic person.6
1 KE Klare “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 146, where the term 
“transformative constitutionalism” was first coined  See discussion of the “transformative” vision of 
the Constitution in C Albertyn & B Goldblatt “Facing the Challenges of Transformation: Difficulties 
in the Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality” (1998) 14 SAJHR 248; AJ van der Walt 
“Tentative Urgency: Sensitivity for the Paradoxes of Stability and Change in the Social Transformation 
Decisions of the Constitutional Court” (2001) 16 SAPL 1 1-27; D Moseneke “The Fourth Bram Fischer 
Memorial Lecture: Transforming Adjudication” (2002) 18 SAJHR 309; H Botha, AJ van der Walt & J 
van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003); H Botha “Metaphoric 
Reasoning and Transformative Constitutionalism (Part 2)” (2003) TSAR 20 20-36; M Pieterse “What Do 
We Mean When We Talk about Transformative Constitutionalism?” (2005) 20 SAPL 155 155-166; AJ 
van der Walt “Legal History, Legal Culture and Transformation in a Constitutional Democracy” (2006) 
12 Fundamina 1 1-47; S Liebenberg “Needs, Rights and Transformation: Adjudicating Social Rights” 
(2006) 17 Stell LR 5 5-36; P Langa “Transformative Constitutionalism” (2006) 17 Stell LR 351 351-360; S 
Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 23-78
2 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 54
3 S 2 of the Constitution
4 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) para 8  See also Liebenberg 
Socio-Economic Rights 25-28
5 S 7(1) of the Constitution states:
 “This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa  It enshrines the rights of all people 
in our country and affirms the emocraticvalues of human dignity, equality and freedom ”
6 S 8 of the Constitution
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The South African Constitution embraces notions of participatory 
democracy, social, and economic equality, protection of culture, openness, 
and transparency. As Karl Klare points out in his seminal article:
“[T]he South African Constitution, in sharp contrast to the classical liberal documents, is social, 
redistributive, caring, positive, at least partly horizontal, participatory, multicultural, and self-
conscious about its historical setting and transformative role and mission.”7
His was the first explicit characterisation of the South African Constitution 
as transformative, from a political, economic and social perspective. This 
view of the Constitution took hold firmly and has been quoted many times 
in academic literature8 and court judgments.9 The transformative nature 
of the Constitution provides a legal normative framework, which will guide 
“the redress of the injustices of the past as well as to facilitate the creation of 
a more just society in the future”.10
Klare described the South African Constitution as a “transformative” 
project in the following terms:
“[A] long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation and enforcement committed (not in 
isolation, of course, but in a historical context of conducive political developments) to transforming a 
country’s political and social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory, and 
egalitarian direction. Transformative constitutionalism connotes an enterprise of inducing large-scale 
social change through nonviolent political processes grounded in law.”11
Marius Pieterse describes the South African Constitution as an essentially 
social-democratic model, quite distinct from the traditional, liberal model 
of constitutionalism, and links this understanding to at least three critical 
aspects, which make the Constitution transformative.12
Firstly, the South African Constitution mandates the achievement of 
substantive equality and social justice through the provisions of sections 9, 
26, 27, 28 and 29. Section 9 of the Constitution incorporates the concept of 
substantive equality, which involves a contextual, group-based approach to 
discrimination and domination and requires remedial measures designed to 
rectify the destructive effects of entrenched structures of past oppression. 
The achievement of substantive equality also necessitates that the material 
consequences of social and economic subjugation be addressed.13 These ends 
are further supported by the inclusion of justiciable civil, political and socio-
7 Klare (1998) SAJHR 153 (footnotes omitted)
8 See Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 23-78
9 See S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 262; Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 3 SA 850 (CC) para 157; 
Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) paras 
73-74; Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) para 142; City of Johannesburg v Rand 
Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W) paras 51-52; Rates Action Group v City of Cape Town 2004 5 SA 
545 (C) para 100; Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 
(CC) paras 343-344, 360; and Head of Department: Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool 
Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 (CC) para 77
10 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 25
11 Klare (1998) SAJHR 150
12 For a summary of the literature on the meaning of “transformative constitutionalism” see Pieterse (2005) 
SAPL 156
13 Pieterse (2005) SAPL 160; Albertyn & Goldblatt (1998) SAJHR 250-251, 253; Moseneke (2002) SAJHR 
318-319; S Liebenberg & M O’Sullivan “South Africa’s New Equality Legislation: A Tool for Advancing 
Women’s Socio-Economic Equality?” (2001) Acta Juridica 73 81
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economic rights in the Bill of Rights.14 This embodies recognition that full 
transformation from an apartheid society requires both a reconfiguration of 
the legal-political structures that upheld it, as well as the transformation of the 
devastating social and economic consequences of its policies and laws. The 
overwhelming levels of poverty still felt to a disproportionate extent by those 
discriminated against during apartheid, will undermine the transformation 
project if not addressed.
Socio-economic rights have been increasingly used as a tool in litigation and 
in monitoring and advocacy related to the government’s obligations to secure 
for all members of society a set of social goods – education, social security, 
health care, food, water, shelter, access to land and housing. Justiciable 
socio-economic rights assist in monitoring the state’s progressive realisation 
of its constitutional obligations to the poor, and ultimately holding the state 
accountable to these obligations.
Secondly, the achievement of political and socio-economic transformation 
requires a “collaborative enterprise”. The legislature, the executive, the 
judiciary and all organs of state are all bound by the Bill of Rights and 
are obliged to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil” its mandates.15 This 
collaborative enterprise is not only an obligation upon the state, but also upon 
non-state actors.16
Finally, linked to this is the fostering of a “culture of justification”17 
for every exercise of public power, where public power is kept in check for 
compliance with human rights standards as essential for the transformative 
project.18 Pieterse argues that this is starkly provided for in section 36 of 
the Constitution,19 which determines that rights may only be limited by 
laws that are reasonable and justifiable in “an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom”. It can also be derived 
from reasonableness review in sections 26(2) and 27(2), which requires an 
“exercise in proportionality informed by a proper analysis of the normative 
commitments of the relevant rights and the impact of the deprivation of the 
particular resource or service at issue on the claimant group”.20 The rights 
of access to information (section 32) and just administrative action (section 
33) similarly play a critical role in societal transformation in that they seek 
to keep a check on public power by providing citizens with the information 
and procedural and substantive protection required for empowerment 
and autonomy of the poor and vulnerable in our society. The right to just 
administrative action is an increasingly constructive and transformative 
tool, for the assessment and enforcement of efforts to address poverty and 
14 Ss 26-29 of the Constitution protect the rights to housing, health care, food, water, social security and 
education, as well as the rights of children to “basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social 
services” (s 28(1)(c))
15 Ss 7(2) and 8(1) of the Constitution  
16 S 8(3) and (4)  S 39(2)
17 See E Mureinik “A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights” (1994) 10 SAJHR 31 32
18 Pieterse (2005) SAPL 161, 163
19 163
20 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 198
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inequality. It focuses on the implementation of legislation21 based on the 
broad, overarching requirements of lawfulness, procedural fairness and 
reasonableness – elements which require a “culture of justification” when 
rights are at risk.22 The reasonableness component of administrative justice, 
in particular, insists on substantive justification for all public action.23
Finally, Danie Brand24 draws a distinction between two understandings of 
transformative constitutionalism among legal commentators: the first explains 
transformation as the “achievement of certain tangible results or outcomes”25 
such as the reduction of poverty, through adjudication; the second “refers 
to the radical change of the institutions and systems that produce results 
themselves”.26
In this article, I embrace both of the above understandings of transformative 
constitutionalism. I assert that the courts should aspire to contribute to 
a reduction in poverty in material terms, while at the same time using its 
adjudicatory powers and powers of judicial review to examine and influence 
“the systems and institutions themselves” in terms of “their processes” and 
“modes of reasoning”. The participatory and empowerment elements of 
achieving social justice require a more modest and less quantifiable – but 
no less important – account of the role of institutions in facilitating socio-
economic transformation.
3  Participatory democracy and social justice
Sen asserts that the attainment of social justice, without public reasoning 
based on participatory and deliberative democratic models, is not possible.27 
Democracy in the South African Constitution can be characterised as 
representative, participatory and direct.28 The participatory provisions that 
support the transformation project are: public participation in legislative 
21 Administrative justice deals with implementation of legislation rather than policy directly – ie only 
implementation of the legislature’s translation of policy into law  See the exclusion of s 85(2)(b) of the 
Constitution from the definition of administrative action in s 1 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”)
22 Note that s 33(2) of the Constitution includes the right to be given reasons for administrative action, in 
circumstances where rights have been adversely affected
23 See Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) 
paras 44-45; Minister of Health and Another NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2006 2 SA 311 (CC) 
paras 187-188
24 D Brand Courts, Socio-Economic Rights and Transformative Politics LLD thesis Stellenbosch (2009) 
2-3
25 4
26 4 and n 12-15  See Nancy Fraser’s distinction between “affirmative” and “transformative” redistribution 
in N Fraser “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation” 
in N Fraser & A Honneth Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange (2003) 7 
45-46
27 See generally A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009)
28 For a discussion of the conceptions of democracy in the South African Constitution, see I Currie & 
J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed (2005) 13; T Roux “Democracy” in S Woolman, T Roux 
& M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2008) 10-1-10-77  See also G Quinot 
“Snapshot or Participatory Democracy? Political Engagement as Fundamental Human Right” (2009) 
25 SAJHR 392, 397-399 on participatory democracy; and Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 28-34 on 
deliberative democracy
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processes,29 in the public administration,30 just administrative action,31 and 
socio-economic rights.32 I argue here, that the vision of participatory democracy 
laid down in our Constitution is necessary to facilitate the transformation of 
South African society into one “based on democratic values, social justice 
and fundamental human rights”,33 and thus to holistically ameliorate the lives 
of the poor and marginalised members of our society. This model requires 
vigorous discussion, debate and activism in the process of transformation and 
responsiveness “to the inequalities and material deprivation that prevent certain 
groups from participating as equals in the creation of a new society”.34 I argue 
that this theory explains the work that rights in a transformative constitution 
are able to do for the poor and marginalised, alongside the conception of the 
role of the state and its citizens in a democratic developmental state.
3 1  Theoretical dimensions of participatory democracy
In Sen’s The Idea of Justice, he states that the institutional structure of 
the contemporary practice of democracy hails largely from the experience 
of Europe and America over the last few centuries.35 He remarks that these 
institutional forms have been ultimately effective. However, he is at pains to 
point out that while democracy in its current institutionally elaborate form 
may be quite new and Western-centred, participatory governance in practice 
has a much wider and longer history in the world.36 He states that in fact 
the practice of elections has a long history in non-Western societies, as does 
“the broader view of democracy in terms of public reasoning that makes it 
abundantly clear that the cultural critique of democracy as a purely regional 
phenomenon fails altogether”.37
He goes on to give the example of Nelson Mandela’s autobiography, Long 
Walk to Freedom, where Mandela describes how impressed and influenced he 
was, as a young boy, by seeing the democratic nature of the proceedings of the 
local meetings that were held in the regent’s house in Mqhekezweni:
“Everyone who wanted to speak did so. It was democracy in its purest form. There may have been a 
hierarchy of importance among the speakers, but everyone was heard, chief and subject, warrior and 
29 Ss 57, 59, 70, 72, 74, 116, 118, 160 of the Constitution
30 S 195(1)(e)  
31 S 33  
32 Ss 25-29  The Constitutional Court has interpreted particular socio-economic rights to include 
participatory elements, most notably in eviction cases where “meaningful engagement” with affected 
parties has been read into s 26  See Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 
(CC) paras 39, 42; Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v 
City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) paras 9-18; Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape 
v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) paras 167, 237-244; Abahlali Basemjondolo Movement SA v 
Premier, KwaZulu-Natal 2010 2 BCLR 99 (CC) paras 113-114  
33 Preamble to the Constitution
34 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 34
35 Sen Idea of Justice 322-354  On the institutional history of democracy, see also generally J Dunn 
Democracy: A History (2005)
36 Sen Idea of Justice 323
37 330-331 (emphasis added)
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medicine man, shopkeeper and farmer, landowner and labourer … The foundation of self-government 
was that all men were free to voice their opinions and equal in their value as citizens.”38
As Sen highlights, Mandela’s understanding of democracy was not rooted 
in the political practice that he saw around him during the reign of apartheid 
based on a European system, but on his general ideas about political and social 
equality, which had global roots, and from his observations of the practice of 
participatory public discussion that he found in his local town.39
This recognition, argues Sen, points to a connection between the idea of 
justice and the practice of democracy. In contemporary political philosophy 
the view that democracy is best seen as “government by discussion” has 
gained widespread support.40 This contemporary view of democracy has 
broadened considerably, so that democracy is no longer seen just in terms of 
public balloting, but in terms of what John Rawls calls the “exercise of public 
reason”.41
While there are differences among contemporary democracy theorists 
about the role of public reasoning in politics, these distinctions are not critical 
to the argument here. What is important to note, is that these contributions 
have elevated the central issues in a broader understanding of democracy 
as being political participation, dialogue and public interaction. Sen argues 
that the vital role of public reasoning in the practice of democracy makes 
the entire subject of democracy relate closely with notions of justice. He thus 
reasons that since the “demands of justice” must be assessed with the help of 
public reasoning, and public reasoning is constitutively related to the idea of 
democracy, there is a direct connection between justice and democracy.42 
The value of this broadened form of democracy, he explains, is firstly the 
ability to make people take an interest, through public discussion, in each 
other’s predicaments, and to have a better understanding of the lives of others. 
The second concerns the informational role of democracy which goes beyond 
its incentive functions, to improved policy-making.
His argument, based on global evidence, is that democracy and political and 
civil rights tend to enhance freedoms of other kinds (such as human security) 
through giving a voice to the marginalised and vulnerable on important policy 
38 330-331; N Mandela Long Walk to Freedom (1994) 21  See the concept of “participatory parity” in Fraser 
“Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics” in Redistribution or Recognition? 730-731  She posits that 
a prerequisite for justice are social conditions that enable people to engage with one another as peers  For 
“participatory parity” to exist, “it is necessary but not sufficient to establish standard forms of formal 
legal equality” (31)  She highlights two additional conditions that must be satisfied: the first requires that 
material resources be distributed across society in such a way as “to ensure participants” independence 
and “voice”; the second requires that “institutionalised cultural patterns of interpretation and evaluation 
express equal respect for all participants and ensure equal opportunity for achieving social esteem” 
(26)
39 Sen Idea of Justice 332
40 324  
41 324  See J Rawls A Theory of Justice (1971); J Rawls Political Liberalism (1993); J Rawls Collected Papers 
(1999) 579-580  See also proponents of deliberative democracy referred to in Sen Idea of Justice 324-326, 
in particular J Habermas “Three Normative Models of Democracy” in S Benhabib (ed) Democracy and 
Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (1996) 21 21-30  See further the discussion in 
Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 28-34 on deliberative democracy
42 Sen Idea of Justice 324
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issues, and thereby influencing greatly their developmental outcomes.43 He 
provides examples of areas where social change has been brought about 
as a result of a “determined use of political and social voice”,44 such as the 
feminist revolution and achievement of gender equality in certain instances. 
This mounting action in organised movements is based broadly on demands 
for human rights, such as the right to education, food, basic healthcare, 
environmental preservation and employment. Sen says that these movements 
raise awareness of particular societal failures, in addition to public debates 
in the media, by providing “a politically harder edge to socially important 
demands”.45
Democratic freedom can thus be used to improve social justice and a better and 
fairer politics. However, the process is not ingrained and requires engagement 
and activism both by those affected by injustice, poverty and marginalisation, 
as well as those who contribute intellectually to the transformation of society, 
such as the legal fraternity, academics and the media.46
This leads us to the distinction between participatory democracy47 and 
deliberative democracy.48 As explained by the chief theoretical exponent of 
participatory democracy, Carole Pateman:
“The existence of representative institutions at national level is not sufficient for democracy; for 
maximum participation by all the people at the level socialisation, or ‘social training’, for democracy 
must take place in other spheres in order that the necessary individual attitudes and psychological 
qualities can be developed. This development takes place through the process of participation itself. 




46 351  For example, the current sweep of protest action against financial greed and corruption under the 
banner of “Occupy Wall Street” (“OWS”) that began in New york City and has spread around the world  
See Occupy Wall Street <http://www occuywallstreet org> (accessed 14-10-2011)  Their web-site states 
that the OWS demonstrations are emulating the tactics of the revolutionary “Arab Spring”, which is an 
example of participatory democracy overturning authoritarianism in African states  
47 See Roux “Democracy” in CLOSA 10-14 - 10-15; Quinot (2009) SAJHR 397-399  For a more detailed 
examination of participatory democracy, see C Pateman Participation and Democratic Theory (1970) 
22-44; D Held Models of Democracy 3 ed (2006) 209-216; F Cunningham Theories of Democracy: A 
Critical Introduction (2002) 123-141
48 Roux “Democracy” in CLOSA 10-15 - 10-18 elaborates further on the contemporary accounts of 
democracy found in the Constitution and distinguishes between deliberative democracy and participatory 
democracy, although they are both closely aligned to the model of direct democracy  He explains that 
“deliberative democracy and participatory democracy are superficially similar since both can be seen as 
a reaction against the tendency of modern representative democracies to produce passive citizens, whose 
power to control their elected representatives is reduced to their right to participate in periodic elections” 
(10-17)
He goes on to explain that the difference between these two forms of democracy, however, is that for 
theorists of deliberative democracy “a particular form of participation – deliberation – may legitimate 
collective decisions even in the presence of fundamental moral disagreement” (10-17) while participatory 
democracy in contrast, assumes “that sufficient, or the right kind of, participation, will eventually 
produce agreement between citizens on a single right decision most conformable with the public interest” 
(10-17)
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one, educative in the very widest sense, including both the psychological aspect and the gaining of 
practice in democratic skills and procedures.”49
David Held describes participatory democracy as part of the same model 
as direct democracy, since they both stress the value of citizen participation 
in the making of collective decisions.50 In contemporary terms, Theunis 
Roux explains participatory democracy as “an attempt to re-inject elements 
of direct democracy into modern systems of representative democracy”.51 
Participatory democracy is thus, in this sense, “essentially about the question 
whether, and if so, how, citizens should be given the right to participate in the 
making of decisions that affect them, notwithstanding the fact that the basic 
form of political organisation in the modern nation-state is, and is likely to 
remain, representative democracy”.52 As Held also notes, proponents of these 
models “often emphasise … as vital for the transformation of politics [that] … 
the state must be democratised by making parliament, state bureaucracies and 
political parties more open and accountable”.53
3 2  Participatory democracy in the South African Constitution
The South African Constitution is said to recognise three forms of 
democracy: representative democracy, participatory democracy and direct 
democracy. There are minimal manifestations of direct democracy in the 
Constitution: the right to freedom of assembly (section 17), the provision 
for the holding of referenda and a greater degree of citizen participation in 
local government (section 152(1)(e)). All formal legislative and policy-making 
bodies are representative. I argue here that at the heart of South Africa’s 
transformative Constitution lies a participatory democratic culture that is 
integral to the achievement of social justice and development for all. This 
is evident both in the legal text of the Constitution and the judgments of the 
49 Pateman Participation and Democratic Theory 42  According to CB Macpherson, the “circular” problem 
with the approach of participatory democracy is that the two “virtues” of participation, that of promoting 
a more active citizenry and reducing poverty and inequality, “are also its prerequisites”  See CB 
Macpherson The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (1977) 99-100, quoted in Roux “Democracy” in 
CLOSA 10-15  In relation to the well-known “circularity problem” of justice as democratic participation 
also see Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 32 (and sources cited by her in n 40-42)  Fraser “Social 
Justice in the Age of Identity Politics” in Redistribution or Recognition? 44, argues that this circularity 
is not vicious but reflects the nature of justice from a democratic perspective, and that the solution to the 
problem is rather to focus on “changing social reality”
50 Held Models of Democracy 210; Pateman Participation and Democratic Theory 42; Quinot (2009) SAJHR 
397  Roux “Democracy” in CLOSA 10-9 defines direct democracy as:
“a system of government in which major decisions are taken by the members of the political community 
themselves, without mediation by elected representatives … [S]uch a system has only ever existed in 
its pure form in the ancient city-state of Athens and certain other isolated and relatively short-lived 
polities … It is also possible for direct democracy to be implemented in subsidiary institutions within 
an over-arching system of representative democracy ”
51 Roux “Democracy” in CLOSA 10-14
52 10-14
53 Held Models of Democracy 211, quoted in Quinot (2009) SAJHR 397
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Constitutional Court over the past fifteen years,54 as well as in the culture of 
social, economic and political activism and debate that has emerged out of 
democracy in South Africa.
The realm of public debate and activism around issues of poverty, inequality 
and development in South Africa spans the work of research organisations, 
trade unions, civil society organisations, the media, and academia; and is 
vividly expressed in the service delivery protests of poor communities and 
demonstrations of mass movements. All of this exchange has contributed to 
an ongoing policy debate in the country concerning government’s macro-
economic and distributional policies.55 As Sandra Liebenberg writes:
“Active debate and contestation concerning the nature of social change, and the political and legal 
reforms necessary for achieving it, should not be viewed as antithetical to transformation, but rather 
as integral to its achievement.”56
This is the notion of participatory democracy of which deliberative 
democracy is a significant component, discussed by Sen above, that will aid 
in the transformation of the current status quo and achievement of a more 
just society. Deliberative democracy can contribute to making participatory 
democracy more meaningful, where all actors/participants are open to changing 
their views and there are no fixed or pre-conceived policy positions.
Besides the value of general discussion and debate in the public arena, 
public participation in the processes of government is also an integral part 
of our Constitutional democracy. One of the founding constitutional values 
is a multi-party system of democratic government based on accountability, 
responsiveness and openness.57 The Constitution expressly provides for 
public access to and participation in legislative processes,58 as well as the 
executive processes by providing that among the “basic values and principles 
governing public administration”59 is that “people’s needs must be responded 
to, and the public must be encouraged to participate in policy-making”.60 
The Constitutional Court has in several cases underscored the centrality 
of participatory democracy to the achievement of constitutional goals and 
54 Cases dealing with participatory democracy that have come before the courts include: Affordable 
Medicines Trust v Minister of Health 2006 3 SA 247 (CC); Doctors for Life International v The Speaker 
of the National Assembly 2006 6 SA 416 (CC); Minister of Health and Another NO v New Clicks South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd 2006 2 SA 311 (CC); Poverty Alleviation Network v President of the Republic of South 
Africa 2010 6 BCLR 520 (CC)
55 See part 4 below on the conception of the South African democratic developmental state
56 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 29
57 S 1(d) of the Constitution
58 Ss 57, 59, 70, 72, 74, 116, 118, 160
59 S 195
60 S 195(1)(e)  Ss 50 and 51 of the Municipal Systems Act No 32 of 2000 affirm the application of the 
constitutional principles governing public administration to the provision of municipal services
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values,61 the necessity of this participation for purposes of informed decision-
making62 and affirmed the duty of the state to take positive measures to ensure 
that the public has the effective capacity and opportunity to participate in 
decision-making processes.63 In particular, it has highlighted the need to 
listen to the voices of the poor and marginalised in society.64
The Constitutional Court has affirmed that the participation of the poor in 
the determination of their access to benefits and services serves the values 
of dignity and freedom as well as gives substance to the deliberative and 
participatory democracy envisaged in the Constitution.65 As Liebenberg 
states:
“A major factor contributing to a sense of powerlessness and lack of autonomy is the absence of 
the opportunity to voice our concerns in relation to decisions which have a major impact on our 
lives. Meaningful participation in decisions that affect our lives affirms the close relationship between 
freedom and human dignity … It not only gives people a sense of control over their lives, but it affirms 
their equal worth as members of a political society … Participation in public and private processes 
of decision-making is not only an affirmation of individual dignity and freedom, but gives substance 
to a participatory and deliberative concept of democracy. This is the best reading of the value of 
accountable, responsive and open democracy in the Constitution.”66
Most recently, a number of cases have gone before the courts in relation to 
administrative justice67 and access to material benefits, which have asserted 
the importance of the participation of those affected by the decisions. These 
cases have affirmed the importance of administrative justice rights of affected 
persons in relation to the rights of access to housing,68 water,69 education,70 
61 In Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 1 SA 566 (CC) para 181, the Constitutional 
Court elaborated upon the goals and values of the Constitution in relation to democracy and 
participation:
“[I]t is apparent from the Constitution that the democratic government that is contemplated is a 
participatory democracy which is accountable, transparent and requires participation in decision-
making ”
See also Doctors for Life International v The Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 6 SA 416 (CC) 
para 121; Poverty Alleviation Network v President of the Republic of South Africa 2010 6 BCLR 520 (CC) 
para 40
62 Poverty Alleviation Network v President of the Republic of South Africa 2010 6 BCLR 520 (CC) para 33
63 See Doctors for Life International v The Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 6 SA 416 (CC) paras 108, 
112-117  
64 Para 115
65 See paras 115, 234; Minister of Health and Another NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2006 2 SA 311 
(CC) para 627
66 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 167-168
67 In cases where a determination of what constitutes “administrative action” has had to be made, and where 
executive public power falls outside the strict definition of “administrative action”, the courts have still 
insisted that the executive must abide by the values of accountability, responsiveness and openness in a 
participatory constitutional democracy  See Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 
2010 3 SA 293 (CC)
68 See Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 55 (CC) (right to procedural fairness when electricity 
supply disconnected by municipality); and Nokotyana v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2010 4 
BCLR 312 (CC) (right to sanitation).
69 See Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions as amicus curiae) 2010 4 
SA 1 (CC) (right to sufficient water and legality of pre-paid water meters)  
70 See Head of Department: Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 
(CC) (exclusive language policy set by school governing body thwarts right to education)  
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and social security.71 For instance, in Joseph v City of Johannesburg, the 
Constitutional Court stressed the importance of participation within the 
executive branch of government, at the level of local government.72 The 
Court asserted the right to procedural fairness of tenants whose electricity 
was disconnected by the municipality due to non-payment by the landlord 
as crucial “not only for the protection of citizens’ rights, but also to facilitate 
trust in the public administration and in our participatory democracy”.73
The courts have also begun to develop a body of jurisprudence on 
“meaningful engagement” with communities potentially affected by evictions, 
based on an interpretation of section 26(3). “Meaningful engagement” refers 
to the requirement on the part of municipalities to hold consultations with 
communities potentially affected by evictions. The Court’s reading of this 
requirement from section 26(3) also has the potential to be extended to policy-
making in relation to other socio-economic rights.
The Constitutional Court has thus repeatedly affirmed that deliberative 
and participatory democracy seeks to enhance and deepen representative 
democracy and the values of freedom and dignity, by expanding the 
opportunities for people’s active participation in decision-making processes, 
including in cases dealing with their access to public goods (socio-economic 
rights). It is about more than merely “participating in periodic elections and in 
the formal mechanisms created for allowing citizens input in the institutions 
of representative democracy”,74 but also going beyond to creating numerous 
fora for dialogue and mechanisms for participation. The aim is to promote 
greater participation in the public and private institutions, which affect diverse 
aspects of people’s lives.75 Those particularly disadvantaged groups who are 
not easily able to participate in deliberative processes as peers or political 
equals, must be given real and meaningful opportunities for participation.76
In this part I have argued that the combination of opportunities for 
participatory democracy to thrive in policy and law-making, administrative 
decision-making and adjudication of rights, will enhance the responsiveness 
of the state to conditions of poverty and inequality in South Africa and move 
us closer to the constitutional ideal of social justice.
I will now locate this discussion in the growing discourse in South 
Africa on the role of a developmental state in achieving higher rates of 
growth and development to address the challenges of eradication of poverty, 
71 See a number of successful court challenges that were brought under administrative law by indigent 
individuals affected by the withdrawal of social security benefits amidst the ongoing systemic problems 
in the administration of social grants in the Eastern Cape: Bushula v Permanent Secretary, Department of 
Welfare, Eastern Cape 2000 2 SA 849 (E); Mahambehlala v Member of the Executive Council for Welfare, 
Eastern Cape Provincial Government 2001 9 BCLR 899 (SE); Mbanga v Member of the Executive Council 
for Welfare 2002 1 SA 359 (SA); Nomala v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare 2001 8 BCLR 
844 (E); Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government v Ngxusa; 
Rangani v Superintendent-General, Department of Health and Welfare, Northern Province 1999 4 SA 
385 (T)
72 Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 55 (CC) para 46
73 Para 46  
74 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 30
75 30
76 32
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underdevelopment and inequality. Though located in a constitutional 
framework of justiciable socio-economic rights, the conceptualisation of 
anti-poverty policies, laws and programmes and the way in which the state 
sees its role in delivering services to people in order to address poverty and 
inequality, is still highly influenced, in design, by the model of the state and 
its guiding ideology for socio-economic transformation.
4  The emerging South African democratic developmental state: 
Implications for socio-economic transformation
Since 2002, there has been a shift by the South African government, 
away from a market-oriented economic-policy approach towards a more 
“developmental state” approach.77 This is primarily driven by a focus on 
the need for public-sector action to remove binding constraints to growth 
through a range of strategic public-sector interventions.78 The concept of the 
“developmental state” emerged out of East Asia and is generally used to mean 
a state that drives development, in a centralised manner in contrast to a more 
laissez faire, decentralised free-market approach.79 It embodies particular 
economic and political connotations for policies and institutional make-up of 
states, and is transitional by its very nature.80 It applies to lesser developed 
or transitional states that are striving to achieve greater economic and social 
success.
The concept of a developmental state has evolved from the traditional 
notion into the 21st century so-called democratic developmental state. This 
implies that the latter types of developmental states also require “effective 
and efficient bureaucracies, resilient leadership, sustainable organisational 
structure, strong state and national building initiatives, democracy, rule of 
law, sustainable economic growth and redistribution, social capital and social 
equity”.81
77 See F Cloete & C Auriacombe Measuring Empowerment in Democratic Developmental States (2011) 
unpublished conference paper presented at the Centre for International Policy Exchanges Conference 
on Improving the Quality of Public Services in Moscow, Russia, 27-06-2011 – 29-06-2011 (on file with 
author)
78 See national macro-economic policy documents: National Treasury Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (“GEAR”) (1996) <http://www treasury gov za/publications/other/gear/default aspx> 
(accessed 27-11-2011) and Presidency Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa 
(“ASGI-SA”) (2006) <http://www info gov za/asgisa> (accessed 27-11-2011)
79 See discussions on the evolution of the concept of a “developmental state” from East Asia in C Johnson 
MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy 1925-1975 (1982); A Amsden Asia’s 
Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialisation (1989); R Wade Governing the Market: Economic 
Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialisation (1990); Z Onis “The Logic of 
the Developmental State” (1991) 24 Comparative Politics 109 109-126; M Woo-Cumings (ed) The 
Developmental State (1999), and in particular C Johnson “The Development State: Odyssey of a Concept” 
in M Woo-Cumings (ed) The Developmental State (1999) 32; P Evans Embedded Autonomy: States and 
Industrial Transformation (1995); PB Evans What Will the 21st Century Developmental State Look Like? 
(2006) unpublished paper presented at conference on The Role of Government in Hong Kong organized by 
the Central Policy Unit of HKSAR Government, Public Policy Research Centre of The Chinese University 
of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Sociological Association in Hong Kong (SAR, China), 03-11-2006 (on 
file with the author); and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”) Economic 
Development in Africa: Domestic Resource Mobilization and Developmental States (2007) <http://www
unctad org/en/docs/aldcafrica2007_en pdf> (accessed 27-11-2011)
80 Cloete & Auriacombe Measuring Empowerment in Democratic Developmental States 2
81 2
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Scholars have recently begun to describe the South African state as a 
“democratic developmental state”.82 Broadly speaking, the discourse in South 
Africa is captured by a state that is determined to influence the direction and 
pace of economic development by directly intervening in the development 
process with the co-option of selected business and social elites, rather than 
relying on the uncoordinated influence of market forces to allocate resources. 
This is achieved through collaboratively establishing substantive social and 
economic goals to guide the long-term process of development and placing 
responsibility on all actors to collectively strive towards those goals.83
The main proposition of this part is that South Africa can at least be said 
to be an emerging democratic developmental state due to its developmentalist 
approach, the increasingly interventionist role of the state in the economy, 
the emergent institutional support for the state’s capacity to realise its 
developmental objectives, and the acknowledgement that participatory 
democracy lies at the heart of the transformation project. However, the 
undemocratic impulses of the state are severely limiting its achievements thus 
far, as witnessed for example in the limitations on freedom of information, the 
corruption and culture of impunity that is rife and the impact that will have 
on the poor.
4 1  The origins and characteristics of the “developmental state”
The concept of a “developmental state” arose from an endeavour by 
Chalmers Johnson to generalise about the model pursued by many of the 
East Asian nations post the Second World War, in order to rapidly modernise 
their economies. In his well-known study of Japan’s modernisation, Johnson 
characterised the basic framework of the East Asian developmental state 
as one where the state sets specific development goals and then mobilises 
society to achieve industrial modernisation.84 The idea of “a centralised state 
interacting with the private sector from a position of pre-eminence so as to 
secure development objectives”85 is generally called the “developmental 
82 See W Gumede Delivering the Democratic Developmental State in South Africa DBSA Development 
Planning Division Working Paper Series No 9 (2009); and various chapters in O Edigheji (ed) Constructing 
a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa (2010)
83 For discussions on South Africa’s evolution from a welfare state to a “developmental state” see: M Pieterse 
“Beyond the Welfare State: Globalisation of Neo-Liberal Culture and the Constitutional Protection of 
Social and Economic Rights in South Africa” (2003) 14 Stell LR 1 1-28; G Rapholo “Towards Becoming 
a Developmental State: A Focus on Poverty Alleviation” (2003) 2 Service Delivery Review 24 24-27; 
R Levin “Building Service Effectiveness” (2004) 3 Service Delivery Review 25 25-28; O Edigheji A 
Democratic Developmental State in Africa? Research Report 105, Centre for Policy Studies (2005) 
<http://www cps org za/cps%20pdf/RR105 pdf> (accessed 31-03-2010); R Southall “Introduction: Can 
South Africa be a Developmental State?” in S Buhlungu, J Daniel, R Southall & J Lutchman (eds) State 
of the Nation: South Africa 2005-2006 (2006) xvii xvii-viv; Congress of the South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) A Developmental State for South Africa? (2005) unpublished (on file with author); S Gelb A 
South African Developmental State: What is Possible? (2006) unpublished paper presented at the Harold 
Wolpe Memorial Trusts’ Tenth Anniversary Colloquium Engaging Silences and Unresolved Issues in the 
Political Economy of South Africa in Cape Town, South Africa, 21-09-2006 – 23-09-2006 (on file with 
author); and B Fine The Curious Incidence of the Developmental State in the Night-Time (2007) paper 
presented at the SANPAD Poverty Conference held in Durban, South Africa, 26-06-2007 – 30-06-2007 
<http://eprints soas ac uk/5611/> (accessed 27-11-2011)
84 See generally Johnson MITI and the Japanese Miracle
85 Gumede Delivering the Democratic Developmental State in SA 4
DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 555
       
state” theory. Analysing these processes, Johnson pointed out four critical 
elements in the Japanese developmental state: firstly the bureaucracy was 
assigned the tasks of planning, constructing and supervising industry; 
secondly a political system was established to support the bureaucracy; thirdly 
when the government wanted to intervene in the market, it left plenty of scope 
for activities of private enterprises; and lastly, political direction was given 
by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry.86 Co-opted elites, soft 
authoritarianism and a submissive population are all constitutive elements of 
the original developmental state.
Since Johnson, the developmental state has been defined differently by 
scholars and development agencies alike. Some scholars tend to emphasise 
the role of the state. In this category are scholars like Manuel Castells, who 
defines a developmental state “as one which establishes – as its principle of 
legitimacy – its ability to promote and sustain development, understood as the 
combination of steady high rates of economic growth and structural change 
in the productive system, both domestically and in its relationship with the 
international economy”.87
Other scholars have stressed the organisational features of the developmental 
state. They identify that a developmental state must also have the capacity 
to formulate and implement its developmental agenda. Key structural 
characteristics are “autonomy” of state institutions, which enables it to define 
and promote its strategic developmental goals, and its “embeddedness” – that 
is, “a concrete set of social ties that binds the state to society and provides 
institutionalised channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of 
goals and policies”.88 In this perspective, autonomy implies the presence or 
high degrees of coherent state agencies that are able to formulate and implement 
coherent developmental goals. A significant feature of the autonomous state is 
greater coordination of industrial change and economic adjustment.
Though not widely acknowledged in the literature, developmental states 
at the same time also implemented social policies, focusing on non-state 
entities such as families and firms, with the state implementing social welfare 
programmes.89 They made substantial efforts to ensure more equitable 
development through land reform, relevant education and training, support for 
small enterprise and provision of housing and infrastructure.90 Improvements 
in social protection focused on measures that would reduce the cost of 
employment and raise productivity. Increasing employment was supported by 
restrictions on retrenchment and elevated spending on skills development.91
86 See generally Johnson MITI and the Japanese Miracle
87 M Castells “Four Asian Tigers with a Dragon Head: A Comparative Analysis of the State, Economy and 
Society in the Asian Pacific Rim” in R Appelbaum & J Henderson (eds) States and Development in the 
Asia Pacific Rim (1992) 33 56  See also Gumede Delivering the Democratic Developmental State in SA 
4-6, who provides a useful summary of the common characteristics of East Asian developmental states
88 Evans Embedded Autonomy 12
89 O Edigheji “Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa: Potentials and Challenges” 
in Edigheji (ed) Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa (2010) 1 9-10
90 Gumede Delivering the Democratic Developmental State in SA 6
91 6
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In summary, the concept of a developmental state has a particular intellectual 
history, grounded primarily in the experience of industrialisation in East 
Asian states. It emphasises the ability of the state to drive development by 
guiding capital toward new activities – achieved under largely authoritarian 
and centralised governance. East Asian developmental states reached their 
developmental goals under authoritarian conditions and dominant party 
democratic systems.
4 2  The evolution of the democratic developmental state
Peter Evans provides the theoretical grounding for the democratic 
developmental state – what he terms the 21st century developmental state.92 
The 21st century democratic developmental state that Evans depicts is 
grounded in three strands of development theory: the “new growth theory”; 
“institutional approaches”; and the “capability approach”.93 These theories 
converge into Evan’s main proposition that “enhancing human capabilities” is 
the central goal of the 21st century developmental state. He states thus:
“Enhancement of human capabilities is not, however, just a welfare goal but is also an important 
foundation for sustained economic growth: investment in human capital has the potential to lead to 
social inclusion and economic growth. From this premise, human capability is both a means and an 
end.”94
Furthermore, this latter approach places great importance on equity 
concerns. Similar to the Asian developmental states, equity is a focal goal and 
institutional architectures must be designed and policies promoted to attain 
that goal.95 The state capacities required for the enhancement of human 
capabilities and the attainment of equity, Evans argues, are the efficient 
provision of collective goods. This in turn depends on both administrative 
capacity and political foundations that are anchored on “active democratic 
structures”.96 The latter is also a foundation for effective economic 
management. Effective provision of public goods, including health, education, 
social welfare and the like, is a manifestation of social citizenship, enhancing 
the well-being of ordinary citizens; and public goods are themselves major 
economic infrastructure required by market agents.97
Based on development theory, in particular Sen’s work, Evans notes that 
because development is about human well-being, “development strategies 
and policy cannot be formulated by technocrats, but must be derived from 
92 P Evans “Constructing the 21st Century Developmental State: Potentialities and Pitfalls” in O Edigheji 
(ed) Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa (2010) 37 37-58
93 37-58  His three strands of development theory are largely based on A Sen Development as Freedom 
(1999), the initiator of the “capability approach” in development theory
94 Edigheji “Constructing a Democratic Developmental State” in Constructing a Democratic Developmental 
State in SA 13
95 13  Eidgheji defines “equitable growth” as:
“[A] high rate of economic growth combined with equitable distribution of income and wealth, with 
egalitarianism meaning that all segments of society are able to share in the benefits of growth ”
96 Evans “Constructing the 21st Century Developmental State” in Constructing a Democratic Developmental 
State in SA 38
97 38
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democratically organised public deliberation”.98 Deliberative and participatory 
democratic institutions are thus essential to 21st century development.99 In 
light of this theoretical foundation, Evans presents the 21st century model 
as fundamentally different to the Asian developmental state and rather more 
similar to the Nordic democratic developmental state where “human welfare 
and public policy were driven by deliberative mechanisms that are more 
broad-based than those made up of government and capital”.100
This understanding leads me to the discussion of the evolution of a 
democratic developmental South African state, and how this notion can be 
adapted to suit our constitutional democracy in support of broad-based socio-
economic transformation.
4 3  An emerging South African democratic developmental state
There is no definitive conception of the developmental state in South Africa 
in the academic literature and policy documents of government, the ruling 
African National Congress (“ANC”) party and its alliance partners, the South 
African Communist Party (“SACP”) and the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (“COSATU”). The literature and policy documents are filled with 
rhetoric and ideology with reference to the developmental state. Nevertheless, 
it is argued that the concept is useful as an evolving and transitional political 
framework to guide South Africa’s socio-economic transformation.
South Africa’s transition to democracy took place under changing global 
conditions. These were characterised by the collapse of the communist bloc 
and the ascendancy of neo-liberal market ideology. A key element of this 
ideology argued for the primacy of the market over the state. This was in 
stark contrast to the newly elected ANC government’s Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (“RDP”),101 which called for a strong interventionist 
and redistributive state. The RDP focused on meeting basic needs, developing 
the country’s human resources, building the economy and democratising 
the state and society. The RDP document defines development in terms of 
a growing economy in which redistribution is a critical element. It includes 
the preservation and development of human resources in the form of skills-
training, job-creation and the provision of education, health services, services, 
infrastructure and an adequate social security system. It also strongly embeds 
the notions of representative and participatory democracy.102
During the first decade of freedom, some progress was achieved in 
addressing RDP priorities, but global pressure saw government adopt the 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (“GEAR”) policy framework. 
Left-orientated social movements, trade unions and commentators saw this 
framework as a shift towards identifying the market as the supreme agent for 
98 43
99 Edigheji “Constructing a Democratic Developmental State” in Constructing a Democratic Developmental 
State in SA 14
100 14
101 Office of the Presidency White Paper on Reconstruction and Development (15-11-1994) <http://www
info gov za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=70427> (accessed 28-11-2011)
102 9.
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resource allocation and an acknowledgement that the inherited formal economy 
would be the determinant of growth and development. One consequence of the 
adoption of GEAR was that development priorities, including the provision of 
social services and economic infrastructure, were subject to fiscal discipline, 
cost recovery and financial sustainability.103 GEAR is widely acknowledged 
to have succeeded in bringing about macro-economic stability, but critiqued 
for its limited ability to equitably distribute the economic benefits of stability 
and substantially reduce poverty and inequality in the country.104
In a context of resource scarcity, growing inequality and ongoing wide-
spread poverty, the making of strategic choices on where and how to 
invest scarce resources to maximise social and economic return became 
imperative in South Africa. Since GEAR, market failure in addressing the 
above-mentioned developmental challenges provided a strong rationale for 
government intervention. This position was reinforced by a resurgent belief in 
the role of the state as a driver of economic development, where government 
leads growth creation and identifies the major beneficiaries of growth through 
active interventions, such as infrastructure investment, job creation, State-
Owned Enterprise (“SOE”) initiatives, sector and small enterprise support, 
industrial policy, targeted procurement and spatial development.105 In 
fulfilling its developmental role, government recognised its position as a key 
facilitating, partnering and collaborative economic agent through planning, 
fixed investment and developmental spending. Public investment has therefore 
become a key mechanism for the achievement of higher GDP growth, as 
this guides private investment decisions and facilitates social and economic 
spin-offs.106 The Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa 
(“ASGI-SA”) economic policy framework announced by the government in 
late 2005 confirmed the return into policy discourse of the role of the state, as 
compared with the mid-1990s.
Increasingly, over the past five years, the state has thus asserted the 
objective to build and consolidate a strong developmental state in South Africa 
– a developmental state that excels in the basics of public administration 
and intervenes strategically in the economy to promote socio-economic 
transformation.107
Fine divides the discourse on the developmental state in South Africa into 
two schools, the economic and the political.108 The economic school focuses 
on the economic policies that the state needs to adopt in order to bring about 
development, namely through the array of interventions associated with 
103 Edigheji “Constructing a Democratic Developmental State” in Constructing a Democratic Developmental 




107 T Manuel Budgeting Challenges in the Developmental State (2004) speech by the Minister of Finance at 
the Senior Management Service Conference held in Cape Town, South Africa, 20-09-2004 <http://www
treasury gov za/comm_media/speeches/2004/2004092001 pdf> (accessed 31-03-2010); T Mbeki Address 
of the President of the Republic of South Africa on the occasion of the Budget Vote of the Presidency: 
National Assembly held in Cape Town (07-06-2006) <http://www dfa gov za/docs/speeches/2006/
mbek0607 htm> (accessed 28-11-2011)
108 Fine The Curious Incidence of the Developmental State in the Night-Time 2
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the East Asian model, especially protection, export promotion, targeted 
investment and finance, and so on. The political school, on the other hand, 
is more or less entirely concerned with addressing the issue of whether the 
state has the capacity and motivation to adopt and implement developmental 
policies. In particular, the focus is upon whether the state has the autonomy, 
in some sense, both to adopt policy independent of special interests and to 
deploy that independence for broader developmental aims.109
The reason for the lack of clarity on the definition of a developmental 
state in the literature appears to be that the developmental state has sprung 
into South African discourse from the political arena and has, until recently, 
largely been rhetorical and unexamined. The concept first began appearing in 
policy documents of the ANC, COSATU and the SACP.110
In 2005 the previous Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel introduced the 
concept and trajectory:
“A developmental state is one that is determined to influence the direction and pace of economic 
development by directly intervening in the development process, rather than relying on the 
uncoordinated influence of market forces to allocate resources.”111
Manuel, in quoting Sen’s book Development as Freedom, stated:
“The task of a developmental state is to fight poverty and expand economic opportunities for the 
poor”.112
Manuel’s text is then heavily quoted verbatim in President Mbeki’s Budget 
Speech for 2006.113 The developmental state has since appeared in the speeches 
of a range of Ministers over the last five years, both during the Mbeki era and 
under President Jacob Zuma.114
The State President has over the past couple of years elaborated on the 
commitment to build a developmental state, which among other things 
entails the improvement of public services and strengthening of democratic 
institutions.115 Two Ministries in the Presidency have been established to 
enhance strategic planning and performance monitoring and evaluation. The 
inclusion of State-Owned Enterprises and Development Finance Institutions 
in government planning processes and enhanced administration of service 
delivery, are some of the ways in which the government is attempting to create 
109 3
110 See eg: ANC The State, Property Relations and Social Transformation (1998) <http://amadlandawonye
wikispaces com/1998,+ANC,+State,+Property+Relations,+Social+Transformation> (accessed 28-11-
2011); ANC National Policy Conference Report (2007); South African Communist Party African 
Communist (1998) <http://www sacp org za/list php?type=African%20Communist&year=1998> 
(accessed 28-11-2011); COSATU A Developmental State for South Africa?
111 Manuel Budgeting Challenges in the Developmental State
112 Manuel Budgeting Challenges in the Developmental State
113 President Mbeki Budget Speech (2006)
114 Presidency State of the Nation addresses available at <http://www info gov za/speeches/son/index html> 
(accessed 28-11-2011)
115 President JG Zuma State of the Nation Address 2009 (2009) delivered at the Joint Sitting of Parliament 
held in Cape Town, South Africa (03-06-2009) <http://www thepresidency gov za/pebble asp?relid=310> 
(accessed 01-11-2011)  
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a developmental state.116 In his State of the Nation Address 2010,117 President 
Jacob Zuma also committed to five priorities: education, health, rural 
development and land reform, creating decent work, and fighting crime, with 
education and skills development at the centre of the government’s policies.
It is clear that the indigenous South African model of the developmental 
state, as distinct from the Asian or any other model, at least in theory and 
rhetoric, means that intervention in the economy to generate higher rates 
of “shared” growth and employment is a means to an end to poverty and 
participatory democracy where the poor can “act as their own liberators”118 is 
central to that enterprise.
Gumede and others identify a number of essential conditions for a successful 
ongoing project of establishing a South African democratic developmental 
state.119
First, it requires the political will and a long-term developmental vision based 
on broad national consensus among political parties, civil society, business 
and organised labour, to industrialise and modernise.120 This requires mature, 
quality leadership and determination on the part of the country’s political 
elite. All stakeholders must then collaboratively implement an integrated 
long-term development plan based on a holistic vision. Successful long-term 
development plans integrate action for the short term, medium term and long 
term. A long-term development plan is crucial for the identification of the 
core priorities of a nation. But these development plans must have public and 
stakeholder legitimacy.121
Second, a fundamental feature of the South African democratic 
developmental state is that it must allow for participation and be capable of 
addressing the socio-economic needs of its entire population, especially the 
poor, marginalised and historically disadvantaged. The conception of the 
South African democratic developmental state is the kind of state that fosters 
the empowerment of people. It is vital that ordinary people are involved in the 
process of development and as they get more involved, they must also own 
the process. Whenever policies are developed, which are aimed at addressing 
existing socio-economic imbalances, ordinary people should be involved. 
116 Zuma State of the Nation Address 2009
117 President JG Zuma State of the Nation Address 2010 (2010) delivered at the Joint Sitting of Parliament 
held in Cape Town, South Africa (11-02-2010)  <http//www info gov za/speeches/2010/10021119051001
htm> (accessed 01-11-2011)
118 Commonly used phrase in various speeches and documents of the ANC
119 See Gumede Delivering the Democratic Developmental State in SA 2-4; and generally Edigheji (ed) 
Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in SA; Cloete & Auriacombe Measuring Empowerment 
in Democratic Developmental States.
120 See Anonymous “Mont Fleur Scenarios” (July 1992) <http://www generonconsulting com/publications/
papers/pdfs/Mont%20Fleur pdf> (accessed 28-11-2011); Presidency “SA Scenarios 2025: The Future We 
Chose?” (September 2008) <http://www info gov za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=89109> (accessed 
28-11-2011); and Anonymous “Dinokeng Scenarios” (2009) <http://www dinokengscenarios co za/> 
(accessed 28-11-2011)  These scenario exercises were developed at different points in South Africa’s 
recent history, with the participation of a wide spectrum of society for purposes of identifying a long-term 
vision for the country, which would then be translated into a plan
121 Gumede Delivering the Democratic Developmental State in SA 11 explains that although most of the East 
Asian developmental states were autocratic, their development plans had wider legitimacy among the key 
stakeholders in society  In Malaysia for example, the New Economic Policy – its long-term development 
plan – became the official “ideology”
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The most critical aspect of this kind of developmental state is participatory 
democracy.122
Third, at the core of the developmental effort is an efficient, well-coordinated 
state, staffed with skilled employees. The state must have the administrative, 
technical and political capacity and competency to facilitate the setting of 
national goals, develop the right policies to deliver on those goals, and 
implement these policies. This also means that widespread corruption and the 
policy of cadre deployment must be systematically abolished. Furthermore, 
the most successful developmental states had a central coordinating centre 
driving socio-economic transformation.123 This centre not only determinedly 
pushes the economy’s vulnerabilities, and makes it competitive, by diversifying 
and identifying new niche manufacturing, but directly coordinates industrial 
investment, actively directs macro-economic policy towards developmental 
goals and protects and promotes the national interest.124 It facilitates the setting 
of national goals, makes use of the market, and monitors whether policies are 
implemented and are having the desired effect. This is not compatible with 
more advanced economies that necessitate less state intervention and more 
transparency and accountability. A successful democratic developmental 
state therefore leads to its own demise as a developmental state, and is forced 
to accept the empowerment of its people and democratise increasingly. A 
developmental state is therefore a transitional state form and is not sustainable 
in the long term if its developmental goals are increasingly achieved.
I will now briefly assess the current state of South Africa’s development 
in practice, as opposed to in theory and rhetoric, applying Gumede’s pre-
conditions for a democratic developmental state.
Firstly, the National Planning Commission (“NPC”) was established in 
2009, to support Cabinet in long-term planning and coordination. The NPC 
is chaired by the Minister in the Presidency: National Planning Commission 
Trevor Manuel, with ANC heavyweight and business leader Cyril Ramaphosa 
as his deputy. Also on the team are ANC national executive committee 
member Joel Netshitenzhe and Business Unity South Africa chief executive 
officer Jerry Vilakazi. The 24 people on the commission come from a cross-
sector of society and have expertise in areas including finance, industry, 
telecommunications, biotechnology, energy, education, food security and 
climate change. The NPC is responsible for developing a draft long-term 
vision and strategic plan for South Africa. They have thus far delivered a 
diagnostic report of all the critical issues facing the country and engaged in 
a process of discussion with people across the country. This led to the first 
draft of South Africa’s long-term plan, which was released on 11 November 
122 4
123 In 2001, the Policy, Coordination and Advisory Services Unit (“PCAS”) was established to coordinate 
policy formulation and monitoring and evaluation of policy implementation
124 See R Davies (Minister of Trade and Industry) 2010/11 – 2012/13 Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP2) 
(18-02-2010) <http://www dti gov za/parliament/022310_Min_briefing_revised_ipap pdf> (accessed 
23-11-2011)
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2011.125 This is evidence, in part, of the political will to develop a long-term 
developmental vision for South Africa, based on broad national consensus 
and to allow for participation in addressing the socio-economic needs of the 
poor. Other examples of participation include the Constitutional Court cases 
requiring the state to “meaningfully engage” with citizens on their needs 
and solutions to socio-economic problems, before they implement housing 
programmes.126
However, the recent attempts by the Executive and the Legislature to 
introduce and pass the Protection of State Information Bill B6 of 2010,127 
which allows state information to be categorised as secret and does not allow 
for a public interest defence for whistleblowers and journalists who expose 
state wrongdoing, is contrary to the spirit of participatory democracy. The 
introduction of the Bill met with strong opposition from civil society and 
opposition parties. It is seen as a return to the apartheid-era repression, and as 
a severe curtailment of the right of access to information and the principles of 
transparency and accountability.128
Secondly, in relation to an efficient, well-coordinated state, staffed with 
skilled employees, the state still has a long way to go. The efficiency of 
the state leaves a lot to be desired, and is constantly mired by widespread 
corruption among officials and politicians alike. This situation will be made 
worse with the adoption of the Information Bill.
Thirdly, the Industrial Policy Action Plan (“IPAP2”)129 builds on the 
National Industrial Policy Framework (“NIPF”)130 and the 2007/08 IPAP131 
and represents a scaling up of the government’s efforts to promote long 
term industrialisation and industrial diversification beyond the reliance on 
traditional commodities and non-tradable services. Its purpose is to expand 
production in value-added sectors with high employment and growth 
multipliers that compete in export markets as well as compete in the domestic 
market against imports. In so doing, the action plan also places emphasis 
on more labour absorbing production and services sectors, the increased 
participation of historically disadvantaged people and regions in the economy 
and seeks to facilitate, in the medium term, South Africa’s contribution to 
125 National Planning Commission “National Developoment Plan” (11-11-2011) <http://www npconline
co za/medialib/downloads/home/NPC%20National%20Development%20Plan%20Vision%202030%20
-lo-res pdf> (accessed 28-11-2011)  See also SAPA “Ramaphosa, Godsell on National Planning 
Commission” (30-04-2010) Mail & Guardian <http://mg co za/article/2010-04-30-ramaphosa-godsell-
on-national-planning-commission> (accessed 24-11-2011)
126 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) (“PE Municipality”); Occupiers of 
51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 
208 (CC) (“Olivia Road”); Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 
SA 454 (CC) (“Joe Slovo”)
127 The Bill was passed by the National Assembly on 22-11-2011
128 See SAPA “Info Bill Will Hide Corruption” (12-10-2011) News24 <http://www news24 com/SouthAfrica/
Politics/Info-bill-will-hide-corruption-20111012> (accessed 24-11-2011)
129 Department of Trade and Industry Industrial Policy Action Plan II
130 Department of Trade and Industry National Industrial Policy Framework (2010) <http://www info gov
za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=108831> (accessed 28-11-2011)
131 Department of Trade and Industry Industrial Policy Action Plan (2007) <http://www tips org za/
node/1402> (accessed 28-11-2011)
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industrial development in the African region. The government’s New Growth 
Path132 reiterates these elements.
In conclusion, whereas developmental states in East Asia were authoritarian; 
in the South African context, the developmental state has to be democratic. 
While this is different to Johnson’s conceptualisation of the developmental 
state as a soft authoritarian state, it is closer to Evan’s broader definition of 
“state embeddedness”. As Gumede suggests:
“South Africa is a constitutional democracy, and the constitution provides for both a representative 
and a participatory democracy. This means that ordinary citizens will not only have to be consulted but 
also to be involved and participate in the decisions, whether economic, political or social, that affect 
them. This makes the challenge of building a developmental state very different in South Africa from 
elsewhere: the state must deliver development in both the economic and democratic spheres.”133
South Africa’s prospects of overcoming its historic legacy of poverty 
and inequality and to offer a way ahead for a transformed society rests on a 
vision of a democratic developmental state. But this vision remains somewhat 
undefined, its implications have only just begun to be thought out and the 
undemocratic tendencies of the state have to be overcome.
5  Conclusion
The South African Constitution is a legal framework underpinning the 
socio-economic transformation of South African society from its unequal and 
unjust past. It lays the foundation for participatory and deliberative processes 
and forums to imagine and conceive what is required to transform this society. 
These processes and forums must be sufficiently inclusive of a diversity 
of voices, and enable all groups, including those affected by poverty and 
marginalisation, to participate meaningfully as equals. This requires positive 
measures to remedy various manifestations of widespread socio-economic 
deprivation and disempowerment in South Africa.
The analysis has pointed to a number of conclusions. The first is that the 
developmentalist re-orientation of the South African state has been tempered 
by the globalisation imperatives, which give primacy to the needs of the 
market, as well as by the non-participatory tendencies of the state. While the 
government continues to stress the relevance of the people in its policy, in 
actual practice citizens and people are frequently passive clients, users and 
customers. With respect to the structural features of the state, South Africa 
is gradually establishing institutional features of a transitional democratic 
developmental state, notably collaborative centralised leadership with a 
collective vision and plan, to promote a process of accumulation whose 
fruits would be shared by all. The key challenges remain the inclusion of the 
non-elites – the ordinary people – in the preparation and implementation of 
a democratic developmental state, and the elimination of corruption. Once 
these goals are eventually achieved, the state also has to change its character 
132 Department of Economic Development “New Growth Path” (2011) <http://www info gov za/view/
DownloadFileAction?id=135748> (accessed 24-11-2011)
133 Gumede Delivering the Democratic Developmental State in SA 11-12
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to a more traditional democracy in order to acknowledge the successful 
empowerment of its citizens.
However, as Chief Justice Langa elaborates, the view of transformation 
envisaged by the Constitution is a process of constant dialogue and contestation 
in the pursuit of a more just society as follows:
“[T]ransformation is not a temporary phenomenon that ends when we all have equal access to resources 
and basic services and when lawyers and judges embrace a culture of justification. Transformation is a 
permanent ideal, a way of looking at the world that creates a space in which dialogue and contestation 
are truly possible, in which new ways of being are constantly explored and created, accepted and 
rejected and in which change is unpredictable but the idea of change is constant. This is perhaps the 
ultimate vision of a transformative, rather than a transitional Constitution. This is the perspective that 
sees the Constitution as not transformative because of its peculiar historical position or its particular 
socio-economic goals but because it envisions a society that will always be open to change and 
contestation, a society that will always be defined by transformation.”134
SUMMARY
In order for socio-economic transformation to have a real impact on the lives of the poor and 
marginalised, meaningful participation in the development of law and policy as well as administrative 
decision-making, is required. Opportunities for informed participation can lead to transparent, 
accountable dialogue and debate on key policy choices to address the impact of poverty and inequality. 
This resonates with a participatory constitutional democracy, which requires decisions to be considered 
in the light of certain fundamental norms and values. The policy discourse in South Africa around 
solutions to poverty eradication has evolved over the past five years from a “welfare state” approach 
to a “developmental state” approach which must have the strategic capacity to mobilise society around 
the developmental agenda and bring technical and organisational capacity to bear in order to create 
fundamental change. The developmental state theory in South Africa is being grounded in principles 
of representative democracy, participatory democracy and accountability of the state.
134 Langa (2006) Stell LR 354
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